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In the quantum version of prisoners’ dilemma, each prisoner is equipped with a single qubit
that the interrogator can entangle. We enlarge the available Hilbert space by introducing a third
qubit that the interrogator can entangle with the other two. We discuss an enhanced interrogation
technique based on tripartite entanglement and analyze Nash equilibria. We show that for tripartite
entanglement approaching a W-state, there exist Nash equilibria that coincide with the Pareto
optimal choice where both prisoners cooperate. Upon continuous variation between a W-state and
a pure bipartite entangled state, the game is shown to have a surprisingly rich structure. The role
of bipartite and tripartite entanglement is explored to explain that structure.
Quantum games as a field received a lot of attention
from the early works of Meyer [1], and has grown steadily
ever since. Connections exist between quantum games
and various other fields, such as Bell non-locality [3]
and quantum logic [2], to name a few. Various aspects
of quantum games, including the role of entanglement
and multiple player extensions, explored by different au-
thors can be found in references [4–6]. A solution to
the quantum prisoners’ dilemma in which players have
a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto optimal ignited inter-
est in quantum games [7]. However, this initial formula-
tion drew criticism because it dramatically restricted the
strategy space of the players and did not persist under
maximal entanglement if arbitrary quantum strategies
were allowed [8].
In this work, we enlarge the Hilbert space in a mini-
mal way in order to arrive at a Nash equilibrium (NE)
that is Pareto-optimal with maximal entanglement. In
addition to the two player qubits, we consider a resource
qubit that the referee, or interrogator, has access to. In
the three-qubit Hilbert space, one can introduce tripar-
tite entanglement which will lead to a much richer Nash
equilibrium structure. Interestingly, for tripartite entan-
glement close to maximum (approaching a W-state), we
obtain Nash equilibria that coincide with Pareto optimal
points. The bipartite entanglement between the players’
qubits partially explains the structure. In addition, it is
shown that there is no NE for a GHZ state, which has a
fundamentally different type of entanglement [9].
We briefly review the standard formulation of the pris-
oners’ dilemma. It is a game of two players, Alice and
Bob, who must decide independently whether they de-
fect (strategy D) or cooperate (strategy C). Each player
receives a payoff and chooses a strategy that maximizes
it. For concreteness, we shall use Table I to determine
the payoff [10]. The best strategy is CC (both prisoners
PPPPPPAlice
Bob
C D
C (11,9) (1,10)
D (10,1) (6,6)
TABLE I. Prisoners’ payoff matrix. In each pair, the first
(second) entry is payoff for Alice (Bob).
cooperate), which is the Pareto optimal choice. However,
by making unilateral decisions, they choose DD, which
is the Nash equilibrium.
The classical game outlined above has been quantized
as follows. Suppose that Alice and Bob are in possession
of one qubit each with the state |0〉 (|1〉) correspond-
ing to the choice C (D). Thus, the set of four classical
possibilities {CC,CD,DC,DD} corresponds to the ba-
sis {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}. A general quantum state is a
linear superposition of the four basis vectors,
|ψ〉 =
3∑
x=0
ax|x〉 (1)
with x written in binary notation. The payoff for Alice
is then
$A =
3∑
x=0
$A,x|ax|2 (2)
where $A,x are the classical payoff values for Alice given
in Table I, and similarly for Bob.
Alice and Bob start with qubits in the state |0〉. The
interrogator then entangles them by applying the unitary
J(γ) = ei
γ
2 σX⊗σX = cos
γ
2
+ iσX ⊗ σX sin γ
2
(3)
Then the prisoners choose strategies represented by ap-
plying unitaries UA and UB , respectively, to their qubits.
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2FIG. 1. Payoffs for A (upper line) and B (lower line) vs. δ
for γ = pi/2. The strategies correspond to (C,C), or UA =
UB = I.
We adopt the use of quaternionic strategy choices [11],
i.e., the Pauli matrices and the identity matrix, so that
there are 4 strategy choices, {I, σX , σY , σZ}. This choice
of a strategy set ensures that the analysis of the behavior
of the game captures the behavior as if the players had
complete freedom to play any quantum strategy.
Finally, the interrogator reverses the setup, by apply-
ing the unitary J†(γ) = J(−γ) to the prisoners’ qubits.
The circuit is shown below:
A |0〉
J(γ)
UA
J†(γ)
B |0〉 UB
(4)
The final state is of the form (1) for which payoffs $A,B
are computed using (2). This results in new Nash equi-
libria which are distinct from the classical one. They
reduce to the classical case if γ = 0 (no entanglement).
Nash equilibria exist for degree of entanglement γ be-
low a certain value (γ < 1.15). In the case of maximal
entanglement, no Nash equilibria exist [10].
Our enlarged Hilbert space consists of a resource qubit
Q, as well qubits A and B that belong to the two prison-
ers, respectively. The prisoners’ payoffs are given in Table
I. Each qubit is in the state |0〉 initially. The interrogator
starts by entangling A and B using the unitary (3), as
before. Subsequently, he uses A as control to apply the
rotation eiδσX on qubit Q, with a control parameter δ
that can vary. The state of the system QAB becomes
|φ(γ, δ)〉 = cos γ
2
|000〉+ i sin γ
2
(cos δ|0〉+ i sin δ|1〉)|11〉
(5)
Then he uses B and Q as controls to flip A. The state
becomes
|φ(γ, δ)〉 = cos γ
2
|000〉+i sin γ
2
cos δ|011〉−sin γ
2
sin δ|101〉
(6)
Notice that, if tan γ2 =
√
2, and δ = pi4 , it is maximally
entangled. We obtain
|Φ〉 = 1√
3
(|000〉+ i|011〉 − |101〉) (7)
This state is the tripartite W -state [9],
|W 〉 = 1√
3
(|001〉+ |010〉+ |100〉) (8)
up to single-qubit transformations (application of σX on
the third qubit (prisoner B), and phase changes).
If δ = 0, this is equivalent to the setup considered
above.
Then the prisoners apply strategies UA and UB , re-
spectively. After they are done strategizing, the referee
reverses the setup of the enhanced interrogation.
The circuit is shown below:
Q |0〉 eiδσX • • e−iδσX
A |0〉
J(γ)
• UA •
J†(γ)
B |0〉 • UB •
(9)
For γ > 1.15, there are no NE with the circuit (4). In
fig. 1, we show the results for the modified circuit, (9)
for maximal entanglement, i.e. γ = pi2 . The payoff for
both players at the NE is plotted as a function of the
control parameter, δ. For δ < 0.41, there are no NE.
But for δ > 0.56, they exist. In fact, they coincide with
the Pareto optimal choice where both prisoners confess!
This equilibrium is formed by both players playing the
identity matrix, i.e., I ⊗ I .
For δ ∈ (0.41, 0.56), a different NE exists that is not
the Pareto optimal choice. This equilibrium is formed by
players A and B playing the strategy choices σZ ⊗ σX .
In fig. 2, we plot the results as a function of both bi-
partite entanglement, and the control parameter δ. For
δ = 0, the curve reproduces the results that have been
previously found for the prisioners’ dilemma with par-
tial entanglement. As δ increases, the payoff begins to
lower generally, and the region near maximal entangle-
ment where there is no NE shrinks. Where there are
multiple NE, we plot the payoff for the NE with the
highest payoff. Qualitatively, there is no NE when the
control and entanglement parameters fall within an el-
lipse centered on δ = 0, γ = pi/2 with radii rγ = 0.42 and
rδ = 0.41. In fact, this is the only region of the parameter
space that has no NE.
In addition, the Pareto optimal solutions are shown to
form a plateau centered on δ = pi/2, γ = pi/2. Numer-
ically, fitting the data to an ellipse, we find that when
the control and entanglement parameters fall within an
ellipse centered on δ = pi/2, γ = pi/2, with radii rγ = 0.90
and rδ = 1.00, the payoff at the NE is equal to the Pareto-
optimal choices. Outside of that region, there is a dis-
continuous drop of the payoff at NE that continuously
3deforms into the NE that exists at δ = 0 in the standard
quantum prisoners’ dilemma with partial entanglement.
The various types of equilibria that occur show a sur-
prisingly complicated phase-diagram-like structure. This
structure is shown in fig. 3. The strategy choices of the
NE in the Pareto optimal plateau are I ⊗ I (type F in
fig. 3). There are two types of equilibria that exist with
partial entanglement: σZ ⊗ σX (type G) and σX ⊗ σZ
(type H). Type B occurs everywhere except for two el-
liptical regions: a region centered on γ = pi/2, δ = pi/2
with radii rγ = 0.75 and rδ = 0.60, and a region centered
on γ = pi/2, δ = 0 with radii rγ = 0.42 and rδ = 0.41. It
should be noted that the so-called elliptical regions, in re-
ality have a slightly different curvature than ellipses, but
their theoretical and analytic description remains elusive.
The type H only occurs when γ is less than a curved
boundary value near γ ∼ 5pi16 .There are regions which only
have types F or G, and also regions which overlap with
types {F,G}, or {G,H}, or {F,G,H}. Type G and H
equilibria give the same payoff for the players, while type
F is different. Along the line of γ = 0, there are two
additional equilibria not shown on the graph. They are
given by σZ⊗σZ and σX⊗σX , and have the same payoff
as types G and H.
FIG. 2. Payoffs for A are shown for all values of δ and γ.
The payoffs for B are qualitatively the same, with different
values, owing to the asymmetry of the payoff matrix.
In order to gain insight into the role of entanglement in
the NE, the three bipartite entanglements are computed
for the qubits just before the players apply their strategy
choices. A partial trace is taken of one qubit to obtain
the density matrix of the other two, then the concurrence
of the resulting density matrix is computed. The three
values of concurrence, i.e., entanglement between A and
B, between Q and B, and between Q and A, are computed
for all values of δ and γ, and the results are shown in fig.
4.
The red surface of fig. 4 represents the bipartite en-
FIG. 3. The NE in different regions of the plot. The various
NE span different parameter regions of the plot, there is an
ellipse-like region centered around γ = pi/2, δ = 0 that has no
NE, and an elipse-like region centered around γ = pi/2, δ =
pi/2 which has a Pareto optimal NE.
FIG. 4. Bipartite entanglements – Red: entanglement be-
tween A and B. Blue: entanglement between Q and B. Green:
entanglement between Q and A.
tanglement between A and B showing that it does not
remain maximal for γ = pi2 as δ increases. The region
with no NE follows a contour of 0.91 concurrence be-
tween qubits A and B suggesting that the absence of a
NE can be explained by the bipartite entanglement be-
tween A and B being larger than a threshold value, as is
the case in the original quantum prisoners’ dilemma.
The region where there is no NE for type G in fig. 3
and the plateau of Pareto optimal solutions appear as if
they might follow contours of the concurrence between
Q and B, yet upon close analysis, this is not found to be
4FIG. 5. Payoffs for A (upper line) and B (lower line) vs. t,
where γ = t tan−1
√
2 + (1 − t)pi
2
, δ = tpi
4
, and η = (1 − t)pi
2
,
interpolating between the GHZ-type state (13) (t = 0) and
the W -type state (7) (t = 1).
the case, suggesting that their explanation requires an
analysis of more than just the bipartite entanglement.
As noted above, for certain values of γ and δ, NE co-
incide with the Pareto optimal choice. This range of
parameters includes the maximally entangled state (6)
(with tan γ2 =
√
2, δ = pi4 ), which can be transformed
to the tripartite W -state (8) with single-qubit transfor-
mations. Then the question arises whether the other
independent tripartite maximally entangled state (GHZ
state),
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) (10)
has a similar effect on NE. To answer this question, we
draw the circuit:
Q |0〉 eiδσX • eiησX e−iησX • e−iδσX
A |0〉
J(γ)
• • UA • •
J†(γ)
B |0〉 • UB •
(11)
In the circuit above, there is an additional step the inter-
rogator performs before A and B get a chance to play. It
depends on an additional parameter η. The interrogator
uses qubit A as control to apply the rotation eiησX on the
resource qubit Q. If η = 0, this reduces to the previous
setup. In general, the state (6) is transformed to
cos
γ
2
|000〉+ i sin γ
2
cos δ cos η|011〉
+i sin
γ
2
cos δ sin η|111〉 − sin γ
2
sin δ|101〉 (12)
By varying the parameters, we can interpolate between
the W -type state (7) (with tan γ2 =
√
2, δ = pi4 , η = 0),
and the GHZ-type state (with γ = pi2 , δ = 0, η =
pi
2 ),
|Φ′〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ i|111〉) (13)
Notice that with the choice of parameters that yield the
GHZ-type state (13), the circuit (11) reduces to
Q |0〉 σX σX
A |0〉
J(pi2 )
• UA •
J†(pi2 )
B |0〉 UB
(14)
Therefore, the state of the resource qubit Q does not af-
fect the prisoners. Without a resource qubit, it is known
that the maximally entangled state does not have NE.
Consequently, the GHZ-type state (13) yields no NE. An
interpolation between the W -type state (7) and the GHZ-
type state (13) is shown in fig. 5. For t = 0, we obtain a
GHZ state which has no NE, while for t = 1, we have a
W-state with a NE that coincides with the Pareto opti-
mal choice. As we increase t from t = 0, we move away
from the GHZ state and we see no NE up to t = 0.4.
There is no smooth transition of NE as we increase t fur-
ther. Near t = 1 (W-states), we recover the NE found
earlier (fig. 1).
The quantum prisoners’ dilemma has shed light on
many aspects of quantum games including the existence
of new NE not readily available in the classical games,
and the absence of NE for maximally entangled inputs.
The addition of entanglement to a third qubit controlled
by the referee is seen to result in a rich structure that can
be either beneficial, or detrimental to the players in terms
of their payoff. If the bipartite entanglement between the
players is near maximal, there is no NE, but by preparing
the player’s qubits near a W-state, the referee can steer
the game so that it has a Pareto optimal NE. Interest-
ingly, not all tripartite entangled states are equivalent,
as the GHZ state gives no NE, unlike the W-state which
yields NE that coincide with the Pareto optimal choice.
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